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price cutting, evidenced by the notice, is contrary to public policy, and defendant relies upon cases in the Supreme Court of the United States as follows: (Citing the same cases relied upon as supporting the decision in the *Ford Motor Co.* case). I am now considering the public policy of the state of New Jersey as distinguished from any public policy of the United States. Unless the article is the subject of interstate commerce, I am not bound by the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States. They are entitled to great weight and careful consideration, but it must not be overlooked that the effect of the case of *Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co.*, 243 U. S. 502, * * * (decided April 9, 1917) is a complete reversal of *Henry v. Dick Co.*, 224 U. S. 1. * * * Suffice it to say that, after careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that, upon the general proposition, I agree with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in *Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.*, 220 U. S., at p. 411."

CRIMINAL LAW—SUFFICIENCY OF INDICTMENT.—An information, charging the defendant with the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses, failed to show any causal connection between the alleged false pretenses and the surrender of the money. The defendant demurred generally to the information. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant was convicted. He was denied a new trial, and appealed, on the ground that his demurrer should have been sustained. *Held*, that there was no ground for a reversal. *People v. Griesheimer*, (Cal., 1917), 167 Pac. 521.

The majority of the court, in the principal case, displayed no hesitation in totally ignoring what has become a well-settled rule of pleading. The court admits that there is no direct allegation to the effect that the money was given to the defendant because of the alleged false pretenses, states that "a direct allegation to this effect would have been more in accord with technical requirements"; but avers that "no person of common understanding could fail to understand that it was substantially charged, by necessary inference at least, that the money was paid because of the alleged false representation, and for the purpose suggested thereby," and relies, for its refusal to grant a reversal, on the provision of the California constitution providing that no judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted for error as to pleading unless the court is of the opinion that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In a strong and well-reasoned dissenting opinion, HENSHAW, J. takes issue with the majority of the court, and upholds a fundamental rule of pleading that every indictment or information must contain direct averments, and only those inferences may be drawn therefrom which the law itself draws, and the omission to charge the causal connection between the false representations and the deprivation of property is a fatal defect in the indictment or information, of which the defendant may avail himself by a general demurrer. The minority opinion likewise attacks the argument of the majority based on the constitutional provision, declaring that, merely because a guilty man has been found guilty, it does not follow that there has been no "miscarriage of justice," but that there has been a "miscarriage of justice" whenever any man has been forced to trial upon a criminal charge under an indictment or infor-

mation which does not measure up to the rules of legal sufficiency; that there has been a "miscarriage of justice," even though the evidence may show guilt, if there was no proper procedure before the court to justify the taking of that evidence. It is to be noted that, in reaching its decision in the principal case, the court was divided four to three, and that the majority opinion fails to cite a single authority in support of its proposition, while the minority has substantiated its argument with unnumbered authorities.

ESPIONAGE ACT—POST OFFICE—NON-MAILABLE MATTER—SEDITIONS PUBLICATIONS.—In an action to enjoin the postmaster of the city of New York from keeping the plaintiff's publication, "*The Masses*," out of the mail, *held*, that, under the ESPIONAGE ACT OF JUNE 15, 1917, the defendant was not warranted in excluding the journal in question. *Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten*, (Dist. Ct. S. D., N. Y., July 24, 1917), 244 Fed. 535.

The particular portions of the ESPIONAGE ACT construed by the court in the principal case were those making it an offense to "willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies," and declaring such matter non-mailable as has the effect either of willfully causing or attempting "to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of the United States" or willfully obstructing "the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States to the injury of the service" or which contains "any matter advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States." The court says that a willfully false statement includes only a statement of fact which the utterer knows to be false, and that the act does not have the effect of making it an offense to make any statement which is within the range of opinion or criticism, or which is certainly believed to be true by the utterer; that the right to criticize is not invaded by the act, and the utterer of any statement may fall back upon a defense similar in nature to the defense of "fair comment" in libel suits. The act is held not to be violated by any action short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law. One may not counsel or advise others to violate the laws of the United States as they stand, but any action other than a *direct* advocacy of resistance to the existing law is held not to be a violation of the act. It would seem that such an interpretation of the act deprives it of much of its force; and that the opposition and agitation attendant upon its enactment was, in view of such an application of it, all a crossing of a bridge which has not been built as yet. (NOTE.—Press reports are to the effect that the Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed the holding in the principal case.)

FISH—PUBLIC RIGHTS—NAVIGABLE WATERS.—Plaintiff, owner of marsh land in part within the boundaries of an arm of Sandusky Bay, off Lake Erie, sought to enjoin defendants from hunting and fishing on plaintiff's land. *Held*, defendants as members of the public were entitled to hunt and fish on the land of plaintiff within the limits of the bay even though the water